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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICI CURIAE
The statement of identity and interest of amici are set forth in the
Motion for Leave to File that accompanies this brief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has recognized the need to improve the Batson
framework and has taken steps to better enable the Batson test to root out
discrimination in jury selection, most recently by adopting the objective
observer standard in State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 226, 249, 429 P.3d 467
(2018). An objective observer, for purposes of determining whether race
could have been a factor in the exercise of a peremptory strike, is one who
is knowledgeable about the existence and extent of explicit and implicit
bias as well as how these biases have contributed to racial
disproportionality in the criminal justice system.
The objective observer is aware that race can affect perception and
behavior in stark ways, as exemplified in an episode of ABC’s hidden
camera show, What Would You Do?, which captured people’s candid
reactions to actors trying to steal a bike in a public park.1 Three similarly
dressed actors, a white man, a black man, and a white woman, individually

1

At least one federal judge shows this to jurors to educate them about implicit bias. Jerry
Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1182 n.250 (2012).

1

made obvious attempts to steal the bike in broad daylight as people passed
by.2 For the most part, the white man was left alone; the black man was
repeatedly confronted and challenged; the white woman was either left
alone or was assisted in stealing the bike.3 Though later interviews of
those observing the three actors typically included claims that race was
irrelevant to their decisions to act or not act, an objective observer could
conclude that race was a factor that shaped their perceptions and behavior.
In the present case, as detailed below, one prospective juror’s
pauses were perceived as thoughtful; another prospective juror’s pauses
caused concern. The first, Juror 4,4 was likely white; the second, Juror 6,
African American. The first juror was struck for cause, though not because
of the pauses. The second juror’s pauses were offered as a reason to justify
a peremptory strike. Additional reasons offered against the second juror
were her familial connection to the criminal justice system and her
feelings about her brother being assaulted by police. Reasons such as these
disproportionately impact minority jurors because, as detailed infra Part II,
minorities are more likely to have connections to the criminal justice

2

What Would You Do? (ABC television broadcast May 7, 2010), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ge7i60GuNRg.
3

If the actor was confronted, at the close of the particular interaction, the scene was reset
to test new individuals and groups with the setting. Id.
4

Juror numbers refer to their respective numbers in the venire.

2

system and are more likely to have negative views of the system. An
objective observer, aware of explicit and implicit bias and the historical
and contemporary experience of racial minorities in the United States and
in Washington, could view race as a factor in the exercise of the
peremptory strike.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Objective Observer Recognizes and Seeks to Address
the Existence and Impact of Implicit Bias and to Overcome
the Difficulties in Uncovering Covert Conscious Bias in
Jury Selection.
A legal standard that requires a showing of purposeful

discrimination cannot redress disparate outcomes that result from implicit
or unconscious biases. That same purposeful discrimination standard does
not provide an effective way to identify and redress covert conscious bias.
This Court recognized as much in State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34, 45,
309 P.3d 326 (2013) (even after Batson, “peremptory challenges have
become a cloak for race discrimination” (citing Equal Justice Initiative,
Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy
(Aug. 2010))).
After Saintcalle, this Court has taken meaningful steps to
ameliorate the harms caused by the deficiencies of Batson. In City of
Seattle v. Erickson, this Court adopted a bright-line rule for the first step,
holding that the peremptory strike of a juror who is the sole member of a

3

racially cognizable group constitutes a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination. 188 Wn.2d 721, 734, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). In Jefferson,
this Court addressed the third step and changed the “purposeful
discrimination” inquiry to “whether an objective observer could view race
or ethnicity as a factor in this use of the peremptory strike.” 192 Wn.2d at
249-50. The objective observer knows that racial discrimination has a long
and pernicious history, both nationally and locally, and implicit bias is part
of the problem. Id. In this case, an objective observer, equipped with this
knowledge, would be well aware that bias can be masked by subtle
reasons based on juror conduct and demeanor, “which are easily alleged
but often extremely difficult to scrutinize.” Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d at 93
(González, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
A. An Objective Observer Could See Race as a Factor in the
Strike Because Juror 6’s Pauses Were Treated Differently
from the Pauses of Other Jurors.
The State relied in part on two pauses by Juror 6 to support its
peremptory challenge. RP 1017, 1018. The first pause referenced by the
State occurred on the first day of voir dire, RP 497; the second, occurred
on the third day, RP 881. Though there was a colloquy with Juror 6 over
the first pause, there was not over the second. The second preceded her
affirmation where she stated, “I am very hesitant about making a decision
that would weigh that heavily upon somebody’s life, but I feel that I am

4

capable of making a fair and impartial decision.” RP 878:7-10. As detailed
below, these pauses are imperfectly reflected in the record, inaccurately
remembered, difficult to scrutinize, and disparately treated.
The first pause is reflected by the prosecutor confronting hesitation
by Juror 6, manifested in the record by the word “Um.” RP 497:1-3. Much
like the suspicion the black actor was subjected to in the episode of What
Would You Do?, the increased suspicion Juror 6 was subjected to is
discernable by how the prosecutor pressed Juror 6. After asking and
ascertaining that Juror 6 agreed that defendants deserve a fair trial and that
jurors are to treat them “fairly and make sure that they have a fair trial,”
the prosecutor asked if she agrees that “prosecutors should have a fair trial
as well.” RP 496:6-497:2.
A. Um, yes.
Q. You seem to have hesitated. And again, I don't know if
it comes out in the typing, but you paused, and your
voice kind of reflected some hesitation. Why?
A. I guess -- I guess it's fair both ways. I mean, it's the
responsibility of each side to present their case, so I
think that -- I think it's -- I think each side deserves
fairness.
Q. I don't mean to pick on you. I just want to ask you, why
did you pause when I asked you that question?
A. I guess sometimes -- I think that maybe sometimes when
-- when people are, like, of certain groups sometimes
may not get necessarily as fair trials as others
sometimes. So I guess that's where my hesitation was
coming from.
Q. Is that the experience you had with your brother?
A. No, not necessarily. I think just in general, like just kind

5

of a culture of -- like Black Lives Matter and some of
the racial tensions that are kind of being brought to light
is kind of the reality of a lot of people sometimes.
Q. Absolutely. Well, do you feel -- I will just put it on you.
Do you feel like you would be able to give us a fair trial
in this case?
A. I think I would.
RP 497:3-498:3 (Mr. Yip questioning, Juror 6 answering, no pause in
Juror 6’s last response).
The second pause that occurred two days later is reflected by emdashes offsetting the words “-- I don’t --.” RP 881:19-22. Though there
was a colloquy between the prosecutor and the juror regarding the first
pause, the second pause was not contemporaneously corroborated in the
record by the judge or the other parties. Also, the context necessary to
properly evaluate both pauses, such as duration, tone of voice, and
demeanor is entirely absent.
Even without this lack of context, the record makes it clear that
Juror 6’s pauses were treated differently than the pauses of other jurors.
For example, Juror 4 paused multiple times just prior to Juror 6’s “Um”
pause. Yet Juror 4’s pauses were seen by the prosecutor to be evidence of
thoughtfulness while Juror 6’s pauses were viewed with suspicion.
Compare RP 480-85, 489:7-23, with RP 496:17-497:3, and RP 880:9881:24.

6

Pauses by Juror 45

“Um” Pause by Juror 66

Though race and ethnicity was not
specified, by inference, likely
white7

African American8

Not questioned by the prosecution

Questioned by the prosecution and
twice asked about why she paused

Expressed hesitation and concern
as to the felony murder rule

Expressed hesitation and concern
as to whether all people always
receive fair trials, citing Black
Lives Matter as an example

Prosecution viewed the juror’s
pauses as evidence of
thoughtfulness

Prosecution viewed the juror’s
pause with suspicion

Prosecution noted the pause for
the record and asked the Judge for
an independent assessment of the
juror’s demeanor

Prosecution noted the pause for
the record by confronting Juror 6
without asking the Judge for an
independent assessment of the
juror’s demeanor

There are additional disparities in the treatment of Juror 6 that
could cause an objective observer to conclude that race or ethnicity was a
factor. One such disparity is that the prosecutor appears to have
misremembered when the “Um” pause occurred. The prosecutor

5

RP 480-485 (pausing at least four times as indicated by em-dashes).

6

RP 496-498 (pause as indicated by the use of the term “Um”).

7

The inference is supported by the fact that the defense argued that the for cause
challenges asserted against both Juror 4 and Juror 6 should be denied, but only raised the
potential for a Batson challenge and specified the race for Juror 6. Compare RP 485-488,
with RP 854:20-855:7.
8

RP 1015:22.

7

represented that Juror 6 paused when she was asked whether she would be
fair, RP 1018:20-23, yet the “Um” pause actually occurred earlier when
she was asked the abstract question of whether the State should have a fair
trial generally. RP 497:1-3. The echoes of this potential memory lapse
appear to extend even to the prosecution’s most recent supplemental brief.
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross Resp’t at 13 (State’s brief) (citing one of
the reasons proffered by the State for the peremptory challenge as “she
‘paused for a very long time’ before being able to answer that she could
give the State a fair trial” without noting the discrepancy between the
record and the reason offered). When Juror 6 was ultimately asked about
whether she would be fair, she said “I think I would,” with no evidence in
the record of a pause. RP 497:24-498:2.
Further, Juror 6 was the only juror that the prosecution confronted
about a pause, see RP 497:1-5, and no other juror was asked the abstract
question of whether the State “should have a fair trial,” the question that
sparked the pause.9 A juror being asked “different and more” questions is
relevant to the determination as to whether an objective observer could
view race or ethnicity as a factor. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 234-35.

9

Compare RP 496:17-497:3, with RP 553:15-554:24, 662:8-20, 770:7-775:11, 785:24786:14, 837:12-17, 922:23-923:3, 979:25-981:5 (questioning of jurors by prosecutor
relating to whether a juror could be fair).

8

A white juror, whose pause is attributed to his concern about the
felony murder doctrine, is considered thoughtful by the prosecutor and by
the judge; a black juror, who explains that she paused because of her
concern that certain groups are not always treated fairly in the criminal
justice system, is regarded with suspicion.
Ultimately, this Court does not need to conclude that an objective
observer could conclude that race was the reason for the peremptory
challenge, as is suggested by the State in its supplemental briefing. See
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t at 16.10 Instead, as stated in
Jefferson, the question is “whether an objective observer could view race
or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory strike.” Jefferson, 192
Wn.2d at 230 (emphasis added). Given that Juror 6’s pauses were treated
differently than those of other jurors, the assertion of the pauses to support
the peremptory challenge is sufficient evidence that an objective observer
could view Juror 6’s race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the
peremptory strike against her.

10

Though the State initially provides the correct rule statement from Jefferson, that the
objective observer need only conclude that race or ethnicity could have been a factor,
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t at 10, it distorts the rule when it states that “[n]o
objective observer could view Juror 6’s race as the reason for the State’s challenge,” id.
at 11 (emphasis added), and that “the totality of the circumstances could not lead an
objective observer to conclude that the peremptory challenge to Juror 6 was because of
her race,” id. at 16 (emphasis added).

9

B. Reasons Based on Juror Conduct that Are Not Supported
by the Record Should Receive Greater Scrutiny.
In addition to adopting the objective observer standard, Jefferson
adopted de novo review for Batson challenges. 192 Wn.2d at 249. Under a
de novo review, an objective observer could conclude that race was a
factor if a reason given for a peremptory challenge is not well supported
by the record. Cf. id. at 251 (“Without a more specific record about why
the prosecutor did not ‘bond’ with a juror, this vague assertion cannot
serve as a valid, race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike.”).
Reasons based on juror conduct should be supported by evidence
beyond a mere assertion by one party that the conduct occurred. Even
prior to Jefferson, reasons offered to support a peremptory challenge were
viewed with increased scrutiny if they lacked support in the record. Cf. Ali
v. Hickman, 571 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that, under
Batson, a reason proffered for a peremptory challenge was pretextual, in
part, because it was unsupported by the record). If a reason offered is not
supported by the record, an objective observer could find that race was a
factor in the peremptory challenge if the juror received differential
treatment. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 250-51 (noting that, under the
objective observer standard, the proffered reasons for a strike “seem[ed] to
lack support in the record” and reflected differential treatment, thus the

10

reasons offered could support an inference of implicit bias).
While GR 37 is not applicable to this case, its treatment of reasons
based on juror conduct and demeanor is instructive. A “pause” is not
explicitly provided for in subsection (i), but it is similar to the giving of an
“unintelligent or confused answer.” GR 37(i). If there is no corroboration
of the conduct in the record “by the judge or opposing counsel verifying
the behavior,” the reason is invalidated. Id.
Without a rule that requires independent corroboration, reasons
based on juror conduct and demeanor could be used by individuals
seeking to intentionally discriminate in jury selection, effectively masking
their true intentions.11 If such unsupported reasons are allowed to pass the
scrutiny of an objective observer, those seeking to intentionally
discriminate on the basis of race will have at their disposal a tool wellsuited to covertly discriminate in jury selection. Even in the case of
unconscious and implicit bias, allowing such reasons to stand without
independent corroboration allows individuals to rationalize decisions
reached on the basis of unconscious and implicit biases without giving

11

Amici are not suggesting that this is what occurred in this case. However, as was
required prior to Jefferson, requiring a finding that reasons offered were pretextual
required a court to find, essentially, that the striking party acted in a racist manner,
precisely as the prosecutor hinted, “I appreciate the fact that Mr. McGuire has phrased . .
. [the Batson challenge] the way he has and not blatantly called me a racist, but still, I
mean, that’s really what it comes down to.” RP 1015:17-20.

11

courts the ability to scrutinize the rationale to uncover hidden bias. De
novo review based on a properly informed objective observer provides an
important and needed remedy.
II.

The Objective Observer Is Aware that Discrimination Has
Led Some Individuals to Have a Disproportionate
Connection with the Criminal Justice System, Which Is
then Offered as a Race-Neutral Reason to Justify
Peremptory Strikes.
An objective observer, for purposes of determining whether race

could have been a factor in the exercise of a peremptory strike, is one who
is knowledgeable about the existence and extent of explicit and implicit
bias. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 249-50 (“objective inquiry based on the
average reasonable person – defined here as a person who is aware of the
history of explicit race discrimination in America and aware of how that
impacts our current decision making in nonexplicit, or implicit, unstated
ways”).
This Court has taken “judicial notice of implicit and overt racial
bias against black defendants in this state,” referring specifically to this
state’s “case law and history of racial discrimination.” State v. Gregory,
192 Wn.2d 1, 22, 427 P.3d 621 (2018). The following case law and
history, recited by the Gregory Court, included not just the treatment of
black defendants, but also black members of the jury venire and witnesses,
as well as the treatment of other minorities:

12

Citation

Parenthetical

City of Seattle v. Erickson, 188
Wn.2d 721, 734, 398 P.3d 1124
(2017)

(peremptory challenge used to
strike the only African-American
on a jury panel)

State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463,
488, 341 P.3d 976 (2015) (Gordon
McCloud, J., concurring)

(describing prosecutor's use of
inflammatory, racially charged
images “highlighting the
defendant's race—his blackness—
in a case where that had absolutely
no relevance”)

In re Pers. Restraint of
Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614, 632, 316
P.3d 1020 (2014)

(prosecutor heckled black defense
attorney in a death-penalty trial,
asking, “‘Where did you learn
your ethics? In Harlem?’”)

State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34,
45, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (plurality
opinion) (second alteration in
original) (quoting TASK FORCE ON
RACE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE
AND WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2011) . . .
[https://perma.cc/6BV4-RBB8])

(“‘[T]he fact of racial and ethnic
disproportionality in
[Washington's] criminal justice
system is indisputable.’”)

State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667,
676-79, 257 P.3d 551 (2011)

(reversing a case in which the
prosecutor argued to the jury that
“‘black folk don't testify against
black folk’” and referred to the
police as “‘po-leese’” in the
examination of black witness)

State v. Rhone, 168 Wn.2d 645,
(peremptory challenge used to
648, 229 P.3d 752 (2010) (plurality strike the “only African-American
opinion)
venire member in a trial of an
African-American defendant”)
State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559,
582, 79 P.3d 432
(2003) (Chambers, J., concurring)

(the prosecution's theory of the
case relied on “impermissible
stereotypes of the Sikh religious
community”)

13

Turner v. Stime, 153 Wn. App.
581, 594, 222 P.3d 1243 (2009)

(requiring new trial based on
jurors' racist remarks regarding
Japanese American attorney)

OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF WASH.
STATE, CONSOLIDATING TRAFFICBASED FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 9 (Dec. 1,
2017) . . . [https://perma.cc/TB4KKAEF]

[no parenthetical supplied but
report concludes “that minority
racial and ethnic groups remain
disproportionately represented in
Washington’s court and criminal
justice system.”]

Amici Curiae Br. of 56 Former &
Retired Wash. State Judges et al. at
8-13, State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d
1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018)

[no parenthetical supplied but
referenced pages review
Washington case law and various
reports discussing racial bias in
various aspects of the criminal
justice system, including racial
bias in jury selection]

Id. at 22-23.
With this knowledge, an objective observer will be aware that
certain race-neutral reasons offered to justify peremptory challenges have
historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury
selection.12
In the present case, Juror 6 was questioned extensively about her
familial link to the criminal justice system, to suggest that such a
connection negatively affected her impartiality. The questioning began

12

Though GR 37 is not applicable here, the Court recognized in GR 37 that certain
reasons for strikes are presumptively invalid “[b]ecause historically the following reasons
for peremptory challenges have been associated with improper discrimination in jury
selection in Washington State.” GR 37(h).

14

with uncovering details about a specific bad experience with law
enforcement but eventually covered Juror 6’s views on the fairness of law
enforcement in general:
Q: Juror Number 6, bad experience?
A: Yeah. I had a brother who was assaulted by the police and sued
the police.
Q: I think they can’t hear you.
A: and he had a lawsuit, sued them, won because of the assault
when we were younger.
Q: Does that, I guess, shape your view of police in general as a
whole?
A: Not -- no, not necessarily.
...
Q: Did it leave any - - any bad taste in your mouth, I guess, that
whole experience and having that happen to your brother?
A: Yeah. It was unsettling. It still is. But it happens.
RP 659:19-660:19 (Mr. Yip questioning, Juror 6 answering).
Q: Did you feel that your family member was treated fairly by the
system? And let me break that down. Do you feel he was treated
fairly by the police?
A: No.
Q: And if you feel comfortable, how do you feel he wasn’t treated
fairly?
A: He was assaulted by the police. But he’s had various cases and
issues, and there have been varying degrees of fairness or - ...
A: And there’s been varying degrees of fair treatment.
...
RP 712:22-713:12 (Mr. Doyle questioning, Juror 6 answering).
In addition to being aware of the historical discrimination against
minority jurors, an objective observer will also be aware that using
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of their

15

ambivalence, skepticism, or even distrust towards law enforcement
officers or the criminal justice system broadly, has had the discriminatory
impact of removing a disproportionate number of minorities from jury
panels.
As a result of the systemic inequalities in our criminal justice
system, black individuals are subject to disproportionate rates for arrests,
convictions, and sentencing lengths. See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 180 (2012) (“More African American
adults are under correctional control today – in prison or jail, on probation
or parole – than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War
began.”).
This observation also holds true in Washington State. See
generally Task Force on Race & Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report
on Race and Washington's Criminal Justice System (2011).13 As
incarceration levels have risen in the black community, so have the rates
of “other African Americans who are connected through filial and social
networks.” Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing
Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury

13

https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol35/iss3/3/, reprinted in 47 GONZ. L.
REV. 251 (2011), 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012), 87 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(published by flagship law reviews of all three law schools in Washington State).
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Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 90 (2009). The objective observer
will be aware of this and could consider race to have been a factor in the
exercise of a peremptory strike against Juror 6.
Finally, it would be contradictory to allow a peremptory strike to
be used against a prospective juror who expresses concerns because they
are aware of the history and existence of racial disparities in the criminal
justice system, when that is the very knowledge the objective observer is
expected to bring to this inquiry. Cf. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 249-50.
Allowing a link to the criminal justice system to be a valid race-neutral
reason for a peremptory challenge will transform the Batson hearing into a
mere ritual that “perpetuates a veneer of racial inclusion that is
substantively false.” Price, supra, at 61. Broadly using a link to the
criminal justice system as a race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory
challenge should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the objective observer standard in State v.
Jefferson cemented this Court’s efforts to recognize the role that implicit
bias plays in jury selection. Under this standard, an objective observer
could view the bases for peremptory challenges that have been historically
associated with improper discrimination in jury selection as invalid due to
the disparate impact on potential minority jurors. Using personal, filial, or
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social connections to the justice system or a distrust of law enforcement
officers to justify a peremptory strike could be viewed by an objective
observer as using race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge. Similarly, an objective observer could reach the same
conclusion when juror conduct and demeanor is used without support in
the record or was the subject of disparate treatment. The objective
observer standard is a crucial safeguard to preserve the fairness of trials in
Washington State.
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